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20 October 1960

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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Department review completed

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


20 October 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

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### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC



### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Cyprus: Cypriot officials are expressing concern over the country's mounting economic problems and the possibility of Soviet moves to exploit the situation. Rumors that the USSR is *OK*

about to offer over \$44,123,000 in aid have aroused considerable discussion in both press and official circles. Vice President Kuchuk has expressed to a US official fears that the country's needs and the continuing Soviet propaganda may force the government--which would prefer more Western aid--to accept Soviet assistance. [REDACTED]

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"French" African Conference: The "summit" conference of former French territories in Black Africa, scheduled to convene in the Ivory Coast at Abidjan on 24 October, will focus largely on the Algerian problem, and may result in the naming of a delegation to urge on De Gaulle a "liberal solution" in Algeria. This conference, organized by Ivory Coast Premier Houphouet-Boigny, reflects the mounting concern of many French-speaking African leaders over the prospect that nationalist pressures may make it impossible for them to support France when the Algerian issue comes to a vote in the UN. The American Embassy in Paris believes France may cut drastically, and possibly entirely, its financial aid to states which do not maintain solidarity with it. [REDACTED]

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### III. THE WEST

Cuba: Fidel Castro [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] believes capitalism is on its way out and that the United States is "finished" as a great power. Stating that he had no intention of letting up in his attacks on the United States, he expressed confidence that the Sino-Soviet bloc would win today's ideological struggle, and said it was therefore necessary for him to align Cuba with the Communist countries. Although Castro admitted that the general economic situation in Cuba was "bad," he praised the operations of the Cuban Petroleum Institute under the guidance of "excellent" Soviet technicians. [REDACTED]

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
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20 Oct 60

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


#### IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US

20 Oct 60



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[redacted] allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.

There have been no significant new developments in the Berlin situation in the past week.

- C. Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/ Communist hostile action continue to exist in Laos and South Vietnam. [redacted]

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20 Oct 60

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Cypriot Leaders Express Concern Over Bloc Aid Offer

Unconfirmed reports that the Soviet Union is about to offer Cyprus over \$80,000,000 in economic aid are causing concern among Cypriot Government leaders. According to one report, Andreas Ziartides, one of the five Communists in the 50-member House of Representatives, will announce details of the offer on his return from a visit to Prague. The Communist deputies are expected to follow up the announcement by placing before the House the entire issue of Soviet aid, and Cypriot Communists are reported to be organizing agitation and demonstrations to force government acceptance.

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Rumors of impending bloc aid offers have been circulating in Nicosia since a visit to Cyprus in early September by the Soviet ambassador to Greece, who at that time expressed his government's willingness to extend economic aid "without strings." Rumanian and Hungarian diplomats have since visited the island and made similar offers of economic and technical aid.

President Makarios, Vice President Kuchuk, and other Cypriot leaders have expressed fear that present economic conditions will make it difficult to reject firm bloc offers. Unemployment is reported increasing daily, a drought has drastically curtailed the production of certain cereal crops, and surpluses of citrus and vine products continue to increase.

Makarios and Kuchuk frequently have indicated their intention of relying on the West for aid. Britain, Greece, and Turkey have all promised assistance in limited amounts. A UN economic team is examining the island's economy, and it is expected that the UN Technical Assistance Program will supply help over the next two years. For the immediate future, however, Cypriot officials appear to be relying heavily on the outcome of current negotiations with the United States for about 4,000 tons of PL-480 grain.

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[REDACTED]  
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"French" African Leaders to Confer on Algeria

A new initiative toward resolving the Algerian conflict seems likely to result from the conference of leaders of former French territories in Black Africa which is scheduled to begin on 24 October in Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast. Invitations to the meeting, organized by Ivory Coast Premier Houphouet-Boigny, apparently have been sent to the heads of 12 of the 13 "French" African states which became independent earlier this year--including Cameroun and Togo but not the Malagasy Republic--and most of them are expected to attend or send representatives. Mauritania, which becomes independent on 28 November, and Guinea, which Houphouet hopes can be induced to re-establish close ties with other former French territories, may also be represented.

The meeting is aimed primarily at concerting policy with a view to heading off a UN vote on a strong Algerian resolution--such as one endorsing the Algerian rebels' call for a UN-supervised plebiscite in Algeria. Houphouet and other pro-French leaders have displayed increasing concern over such a development, observing that no African leader could survive if he opposed an Algerian resolution. Present indications are that the meeting will result in the naming of a delegation charged with urging a "liberal solution" on De Gaulle and also aim at agreement on tactics to be pursued at the UN. [Senegal's UN representative has already indicated his preference for a resolution based on De Gaulle's repeated calls for a cease-fire and directed toward encouraging a resumption of direct talks between France and the rebels.]

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Should the "French" Black African states not support France against a strong Algerian resolution, the American Embassy in Paris believes the French Government may curtail drastically, and possibly cut off entirely, the economic aid on which all these states depend. Direct French assistance amounted to over \$200,000,000 in 1960. Houphouet stated in August he had been told flatly by two high-ranking members of De Gaulle's regime, under circumstances which suggested De Gaulle's concurrence, that all economic and technical assistance would be cut off from African states which voted against France on the Algerian question. [REDACTED]

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Fidel Castro Comments on Current Cuban Policies

In mid-September 1960, Castro reportedly [redacted]

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[redacted] -that he believed capitalism is on the way out, that the United States is "imperialist" as a major world power, that it is corrupt, two-faced, and insincere, and that American democracy is really a sham. He said he had no intention of letting up in his attacks since in its "present state of confusion" the United States must be kept on the defensive. He expressed confidence that the Sino-Soviet bloc would win the ideological war and he therefore deemed it necessary to align Cuba with the Communist countries. Since this conversation, Castro has appointed an ambassador to Communist China, and Cuba has become the first non-bloc nation to afford diplomatic recognition to North Korea.

Castro went to considerable lengths in describing himself as the rising leader of Latin America and Africa, and he stated that only by taking an uncompromising attitude toward the United States could he keep faith with his obligation to the peoples of these areas. He specifically indicated concern about the attitude of the Betancourt government in Venezuela toward the Castro government, saying that if the Venezuelans were not with him, he could "undermine their economy. . . and bring them to their knees."

Castro said that he felt he had Cuba "very well in hand politically," and scoffed at reports of differences among regime leaders. He said he was unconcerned about the large number of defectors among his original supporters, since "only the weak ones" were taking such steps. He emphasized that the people's militia, which he asserted would be reliable and well trained, would make any armed aggressors "extremely sorry for their efforts."

Castro admitted that Cuba's economic situation was bad and that considerable difficulty was being experienced in "production." His comments on Soviet technical assistance were enthusiastic, however, and he praised the Soviet technicians guiding the operations of the Cuban Petroleum Institute. "With all these excellent people in Cuba," he said, "we will defeat the corrupt capitalistic system." [redacted]

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Scientific Adviser to the President  
Director of the Budget  
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization  
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The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

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The Under Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration  
The Counselor  
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The Director, The Joint Staff  
Chief of Staff, United States Army  
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
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